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In essence, injunctive relief should be given when a plaintiffs
constitutional rights are threatened by "bad faith" criminal prosecution.
If an injunction were not granted, the only remedy left would be to
subject the plaintiff to the uncertainties and dangers of multiple
criminal prosecution. It is these imponderables and contingencies that
inhibit the full exercise of first amendment rights. In such a case the
remedy at law would be at war with itself. Therefore, the rule
established in Harris seems to be in conflict with the public policy of
assuring that legitimate conduct is not inhibited by unnecessary legal
uncertainty.5
7
The final result of the Harris decision is that an individual's con-
stitutional rights vary depending upon whether or not he is able to
file his papers in the federal court before the prosecution can present
its case to a grand jury. This "race to the court house" was predicted
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Dombrowski in
which he said: "to make standing and criminality turn on which
party wins the race to the forum of its own choice is to repudiate the
considerations of federalism to which the Court pays lip service."58
Despite the ambiguities and the questions left unanswered in
Younger v. Harris, the decision appears to signal a retreat in the
judicial attitude toward substantive due process by restricting the
availability of injunctive relief.
Stephen Driesler
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TBE INDIGENT DEFENDANT MOVES ONE STEP
CLOSER TO EQUALITY.
We should say now, and in no uncertain terms, that a man's mere
property status, without more, cannot be used by a state to test,
qualify, or limit his rights as a citizen of the United States. 'Indi-
gence' in itself is neither a source of rights nor a basis for denying
them. The mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact-
constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, creed, or color....
Any measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis of
property into one class free to move from state to state and another
class that is poverty bound to the place where it has suffered
misfortune is not only at war with the habit and custom by which
our country has expanded, but is also a short-sighted blow at the
security of property itself. Property can have no more dangerous,
even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its possession
5 7 See Bunis v. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d 207, 234 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1962),
appeal dismissed, 12 N.Y.2d 882, 188 N.E.2d 260 (1963).
5s 380 U.S. at 502 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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a pretext for unequal or exclusive civil rights. Where those rights
are derived from national citizenship no state may impose such a
test. . ...
Where 30 years previously,2 the Supreme Court of the United States
had so adamently deplored a state law which attempted to restrict a
person's freedom of motion from one state to another because of his
indigent status,3 in the recent case of Tate v. Short4 it was confronted
with an equally dangerous and even more pervasive type of restriction.
In Tate, this boundary was intensified to the confinement of a four wall
prison cell. In this case, the defendant was convicted in the Corpora-
tion Court of Houston, Texas of nine traffic offenses and was fined
$425.00. Tate claimed himself to be an indigent and unable to pay
his fine. Although Texas only provides a monetary penalty for traffic
convictions, a state statute5 required the Corporation Court to incar-
cerate the defendant for a sufficient time (85 days in this case) to
satisfy the fine. His application for writ of habeas corpus, although
based on a state statute,6 was denied by the County Criminal Court.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.7
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.8 The Court
1 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-85 (1941) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
3 In the past, the Court has decided many cases based on a defendant's status
as an indigent. See the list of cases at note 24 infra. As applied in these cases the
term 'indigent" is best defined as a person ".... who is financially unable to employ
to his advantage the institution or service under consideration." See also, Note,
Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griflin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L.
Rxv. 394, 395 n.10 (1964).
4 39 U.S.L.W. 4301 (U.S. March 2, 1971).
5 TEx. CODE CDIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 43.09 (1966) provides:
When a defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor and his punishment is
assessed at a pecuniary fine, if he is unable to pay the fine and costs ad-
judged against him, he may for such time as will satisfy the judgment be
put to work in the workhouse... or if there be no such workhouse, farm
or improvements, he shall be imprisoned in jail for a sufficient length of
time to discharge the full amount of fine and costs adjudged against him;
rating such labor or imprisonment at five dollars for each day thereof-
provided, however, that the defendant may pay the pecuniary fine assessed
against him at any time while he is serving.., his jail sentence, and in
such instances he shall be entitled to a credit of five dollars for each day
or fraction of a day that he has served and he shall only be required to
,ay his balance of the pecuniary fine against him.
, TEx. CODE Crum. PRoc. ANN. art. 45.53 (1966) provides in pertinent part:
A defendant placed in jail on account of failure to pay the fine and costs
can be discharged on habeas corpus by showing:
1. That he is too poor to pay the fine and costs; ...
7 Ex Parte Tate, 445 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1969). In affirming the decision of the
Harris County Criminal Court denying Tate's application for a writ of habeas
corpus, the court said:
We overrule appellant's contention that because he is too poor to pay the
fine his imprisonment is unconstitutional. His status as an indigent does
not render this petitioner immune from criminal prosecution. Id. at 211.
8 Tatev. Short, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
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reversed, holding that it is an invidious discrimination and thus, a
denial of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to automatically convert a fine into imprisonment solely because a
defendant is unable to pay due to his status of indigency.
At common law, the fine originated as the principle punishment for
misdemeanors. 9 Subsequently, a term of imprisonment on default of
payment was constituted,10 and as early as the thirteenth century the
duration of such term of imprisonment was indefinite.11 In the United
States, most states have enacted legislation whereby the offender is
required to discharge the fine by serving a term of imprisonment.
The duration of this imprisonment is not indefinite but rather the
respective statutes equate a certain number or fraction of dollars
with a day's imprisonment.'
12
9 See I J. BISHOP, A TREATISE Or CmNAL LAw 693 (9th ed. 1928); S.
RuBIN, H. WEmoFEN, G. EDW.RDS & S. RosENzwEic, THE LAW or CnvnNAL Con-
REaroN 226 (1963) [hereinafter cited as RUBIN], which states:
The origin of the fine has . .. been traced to the practice, early in the
posifeudal era, of grading penance for wrongs to the monetary status of
the wrongdoer, so that upperclass persons, with the means to pay, were
punished with money fines in accordance with their economic status while
lower class persons without means were subject to other types of punish-
ments. Id. citing G. RusCHE & 0. KiRCHEMIER, PUNISmMENT AND SocLAL
STruBruE 166 (1939).
See also 2 W. HoLDsWORTH, A HInSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 43-50 (3d ed. 1923);
L. STaRGE, STEPHmEN's DIGEST OF THE Cunn mns LAW 42, 487 (8th ed. 1947).10 In 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 517-18
(1911), the authors stated:
In theory the fine is a bilateral transaction, a bargain; it is not 'imposed,'
it is 'made' . . . The wrongdoer but rarely goes to prison even for amoment.... The justices do not wish to keep him in gaol, they wish to
make him pay money.... The causes for fines were now very numerous,
and the king preferred a power of inflicting many small penalties to that
of demanding heavy sums in a few grave cases.
See RuBIN, supra note 9, at 227; E. SuT-ErI-n& & D. CnEssEY, CRUNOLOGY 275
(6th ed. 1960); Comment, 64 Mic. L. REv. 938 (1966). See also Note, Fines,
Imprisonment, and the Poor: "Thirty Dollars or Thirty Days," 57 CAi. L. REv.
778, 779-80 (1969).
11 RuBN, supra note 9, at 227.
12 ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 341 (1959) ($2 to $4 per day); ALAs. STAT. § 12.55.010
(1962) ($5 to $10 per day); ARIz. B.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956) ($1 per
day); Anic. STAT. ANN. § 46-510 (1964) ($1 per day); CAr. PEN. CODE § 1205
(1970) ($5 per day); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 18-13 (1968) ($3 per day); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 951.15-.16 (Supp. 1971) ($0.30 per day); HAWAII REv. STAT. §
712-5 (1968) ($5 per day); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2517 (Supp. 1969) ($5 per
day); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7 (Smithhurd Supp. 1971) ($5 per day); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-2227a (Burns Supp. 1970) ($5 per day); IOWA CODE ANN. § 789.17
(1950) ($3.33 per day); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 431.140-.150 (1971) ($2 per day);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1904 (Supp. 1970) ($5 per day); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 38, § 4 (Supp. 1970) ($10 per day); MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 127, § 144 (Supp.
1970) ($3 per day); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 641.10 (Supp. 1971) ($3 per day); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 543.270 (1969) ($2 to $10 per day); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §
95-2303 (1969) ($10 per day); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2412 (1965) ($6 per day);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.065 (1967) ($4 per day); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:16
(Supp. 1970) ($5 per day); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-16 (Supp. 1970) ($5 per
day); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-92A (Supp. 1969) ($5 per day); N.D. CENT. CODE
(Continued on next page)
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It is estimated that fines constitute 75% of all sentences13 and a
very high percentage of those fined are imprisoned for nonpayment.' 4
These high percentages are illustrative of the fact that courts have
lost sight of the common law purpose for establishing a punishment
on default of payment.15 Imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine is
not punishment for a substantive offense but rather a means to coerce
payment.'6 The purpose of alternative fine statutes or statutes pro-
viding imprisonment on default of payment will never be fulfilled by
imprisoning indigents. To imprison an indigent for nonpayment of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
ANN. § 29-26-21 (1960) ($2 per day); OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.14 (1954)
($3 per day); OsLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 20 (1969) ($1 per day); Onp. BEv.
STAT. § 137.150 (1969) ($5 per day); GEN. LAws OF R.I. tit. 13, ch. 2-36 (1969)
($5 per day); S.D. Comp'. LAws ANN. tit. 23, ch. 48-23 (1967) ($2 per day); TEX.
CODE Cnm. PRoc. ANN. art. 43.09 (1966) ($5 per day); UTAH CODE: ANN. § 77-35-
15 (1953) ($2 per day); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 7221-23 (Supp. 1970) ($1
per day); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-221 (Supp. 1970) ($0.75 per day worked. $0.25
per other day); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.82.030 (Supp. 1970) ($10 per day
worked, $8 per other day); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-4-10 (1966) ($1.50 per day);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-8 (1957) ($1 per day). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3565 1964).
13 See Note, Fines and Fining-An Evaluation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1013, 1014
(1953), citing, J. MICHAEL & M. ALDER, INsTrruTE OF CpmiNOLOGY AND OF
CRnIMINL JUsTICE 479 (1932) and E. SUTHERLAND, PracinPLES OF CnnMNOLOGY
572 (4th ed. 1947).
14 See AmEwcA- BAR ASSoCiArTIoN SENTENCiNC ALTERNATVEs AND PNo-
cEnur 120 (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA]; 3 NATrONAL
CoM1sfissIoN ON LAw OBSERvANcE AND ENFoR CEmNT, REPORT ON PENAL IN-
STrrUTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE 140-41 (1931); RuBiN, supra note 9, at 252-53;
101 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 13, at 1022.
15 See ABA, supra note 14, at 292 where it is stated that:
[llmprisonment should not lie a substitute for payment but instead an en-
forcement device used in the case of those who have inexcusably refused
to pay ...
See also Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Edgerton, I., dissenting). This dissenting opinion suggests that through the
holding of & case, imprisonment for nonpayment has become as much a part
of the punishment as the fine itself.
16 See Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Edgerton, J., dissenting); McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, -, 26 N.E.2d
949, 951 (Ct. App. 1940); City of Buffalo v. Murphy, 228 App. Div. 279, 287, 239
N.Y.S. 206, 216 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1930); People ex rel. Loos v. Redman, 48
Misc. 2d 592, -, 265 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (Sup. Ct. 1965); People v. Collins,
47 Misc. 2d 210, -, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (Orange County Ct. 1965);
Foertsch v. Jameson, 204 N.W. 175, 176 (S.D. 1925). See generally People v.
Gittelson, 25 A.D.2d 265, -, 268 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785-86 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1966); People ex rel. Gately v. Sage, 13 App. Div. 135, - 43 N.Y.S. 372, 373
(1897); People v. Watson, 204 Misc. 467, -, 126 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (Ct. Cen.
Sess., N.Y. County 1953) where the court stated:
[I]t is settled that this remedy for the collection of a fine is not part of the
sentence. It is simply a means of enforcing the sentence....
A direction in a sentence imposing a fine that defendant stand
committed until the fine is paid is no part of the penalty for the offense,
but is merely a means of compelling obedience to the judgment of the
court. City of Buffalo v. Murphy, supra at -- , 239 N.Y.S. at 216.
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fines is to work an invidious discrimination based on economic status
and punish him for his indigency.17
Tate is important in its immediate holding since its impact will be
felt in almost every state. It's significance and importance, aside from
such direct impact, derives from the equality which the Court has in
fact created-indigent defendants are to receive equal treatment.
Although the Court's decisions in Hill v. United States ex. rel. Wam-
plerls and Ex Parte Jacksorn'9 upheld the constitutionality of state
statutes which provided for the conversion of a fine into imprisonment
upon default of payment, it did not reach the issue of inequality
presently raised in Tate. In the latter, it followed and further expanded
the holding in two of its recent decisions, Williams v. Illinois,2 0 and
Morris v. Schoonfield.21 In Williams, the Court held that a state could
not constitutionally imprison an indigent defendant beyond the maxi-
mum duration fixed by statute solely because he was financially unable
to pay a fine. Morris was remanded for reconsideration in light of the
Williams decision.
17 See Comment, 4 HousT. L. Bxv. 695, 700 (1967).
18 298 U.S. 460 (1936).
19 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
20 399 U.S. 235 (1970). This case was preceded by a number of appellate
cases which found that the imprisonment of an indigent defendant for default of
payment, in addition to the maximum confinement permitted by the substantive
statute was a violation of defendant's constitutional rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 593-94
(D.C. Cir. 1960) (Edgerton, J., dissenting); Sawyer v. District of Columbia, 238
A.2d 314, 316 (Dist. Col. Ct. App. 1968); State v. Allen, 249 A.2d 70, 76-77 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969) (Conford, J., dissenting); People v. Tennyson, 19
N.Y.2d 753, - , 281 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (Ct. App. 1967); People v. Mackey, 18
N.Y.2d 755, 221 N.E.2d 462 (Ct. App. (1966); People v. Saffore, 18 N.Y.2d 101,
-, 271 N.Y.S.2d 972, 975 (Ct. App. 1966); People v. Johnson, 24 App. Div. 2d
577, -, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (Hopkins, J., concur-
ring); People v. McMillan, 53 Misc. 2d 685, -- , 279 N.Y.S.2d 941, 942-43 (Orange
County Ct. 1967); People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, -, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973
(Orange County Ct. 1965); Strattman v. Studt, 253 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ohio 1969).
The court in People v. McMillan, supra, profoundly noted:
It is to be hoped that the Legislature will modify the law with respect to
the payment of fines in cases involving indigent defendants....
In these times in which all of the engines of the criminal law are
driving toward preserving and defending the rights of the indigent,
our local courts should avoid resort to an archaic system akin to im-
prisonment for debt. Id. at 943.
See also United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
Although the court re ected the defendant's argument that the additional term of
imprisonment imposed, as a result of his nonpayment of a fine, was unfair because
a defendant with funds could be released, dictum suggested that an additional
imprisonment beyond the maximum permissible by a substantive statute would
be invalid. Id. at 121.
21399 U.S. 508 (1970). The Court seemed to anticipate Tate v. Short as
demonstrated by the following statement:
[T]he Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence
and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full. Id. at 509.
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Even though Williams and Morris provide important precedent
which the Court relies upon in deciding Tate, Griffin v. Illinois22 is the
more important case. The Court, in Griffin, held that an indigent
defendant could not be denied adequate appellate review because he
had no money for a certified copy of the trial record, while all others
who had the ability to pay could receive such review. In relation to
setting trends, Griffin was the first case which pronounced an effort to
alleviate economic discrimination in criminal proceedings. 23 Following
the Griffin rationale, a growing body of case law24 ". . . has come to
treat the unequal impact of certain state activities as 'invidious dis-
crimination' forbidden by the fourteenth amendment."25 With the
many protections now extended to indigent defendants to guarantee
their equal protection of the laws, it would seem proper to extend
this constitutional protection to the sentencing process.26
The Court had previously held that the central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate invidious "racial" discrimina-
22351 U.S. 12 (1956). In this case the Court stated that even though a law
may be nondiscriminatory on its face, it could be grossly discriminatory in its
operation. The Court further said:
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded
as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to
buy transcripts. Id. at 19.
23 See, Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205,
218 (1964); 4 Housr. L. REv., supra note 17, at 698; 64 Micn. L. REv., supra
note 10, at 941. See generally Comment, 10 VAND. L. REv. 141, 144 (1956).
24The Grifin logic was extended in the cases to follow in which the Court
has concentrated its efforts into providing rights and privileges denied to indigent
defendants solely on the basis oftheir economic status. See Williams v. Oklahoma
City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969) (can't be denied right of appeal for lack of money to
pay for a trial transcript); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1968) (free
transcript furnished on appeal); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (can't
be denied access to instruments needed to assert legal rights); Long v. District
Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (free transcript on appeal); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to have an attorney at interrogation);
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (state can't deny right to appeal);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (adequate and effective appellate
review); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (appellate review); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (free appellate counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (right to counsel); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962)
(procedural safeguards on appeal); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (state
must docket petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192
(1960) (must be afforded an adequate remedy for appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360
U.S. 252 (1959) (no financial restrictions on appellate review); Eskridge v. Wash-
ington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (full appellate
review).
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor
criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each. Smith v. Ben-
nett, supra at 714.25 Note, Discrimination Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81
H~nv. L. 1Ev. 435 (1968).
26 See Note, Imprisonment for Nonpayment of Fines and Costs: A New Look
at the Law and the Constitution, 22 V m-. L. REv. 611, 627-28 (1969).
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tion in the states,27 however, recent decisions have expanded the
original purpose of the fourteenth amendment to apply to any invidious
discrimination 28 and especially those "suspect" classifications based on
one's economic status.29 However, discrimination alone is not sufficient
to render a statute unconstitutional. 30 Legislative classification is pro-
vided for in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.31 Such a classification, however, must be drawn without creating
an invidious discrimination against a particular class.32 It must also
present a real, reasonable, and substantial difference founded upon a
legitimate legislative objective 3 3 What the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits is the arbitrary selection of a class of individuals34 or an
irrational classification 5 which ". . . was aimed at undue favor and
27 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948); Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia 100 U.S. 803, 307-308 (1880); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36, 71, 81 (1873).28 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). In Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 478 (1953) the court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not
directed solefy against differences between "white" and "black', but could apply
as well to any particular class treated differently without any reasonable legislative
basis. See generally Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1957); Dowd v. United
States ex. rel. Cook 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1950); Cockran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255,
257 (1941).29 See note 24 supra, and accompanying text. In interpreting this Amend-
ment's purpose, the Court in Brown v. Bd. of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
492 (1953) (dictum) emphasized that its protection was not limited to its original
purpose as adopted in 1868. Further supporting Brown the Court in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) said:
Likewise the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitionally
discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality .... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause do change.
30 See, e.g., Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963) in which the Court said:
Exact equality is no prerequisite of equal protection of the laws within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment... Id. at 423.
See generally, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963); Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1943).31 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
82 8ee Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
33 See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362 (1970); McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31-2 (1884);
Dowd v. Stuckey, 51 N.E.2d 947, 948 (Ind. 1943).
Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others, is
prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose,
is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects
alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment. Barbier
v. Connolly, supra at 32.
See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963).
34 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 188 (1964); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1893); McPherson
v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1892); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72
(1886).
35 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). See generally
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1941).
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individual or class privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile dis-
crimination or the oppression of inequality, on the other." 6
In earlier decisions the Court suggested that the Equal Protection
Clause was designed to secure an individual against intentional and
purposeful discrimination.37 Since such discrimination was not pre-
sumed, the burden of proof was placed on the defendant to show an
irrational and arbitrary legislative classification.28 However in applying
this theory to recent cases finding in favor of indigent defendants, it
appears that this burden of proof has been placed upon the State to
justify discriminations which operate harshly on the poor.39 Classifi-
cations should be inspected with care and if they seem contrary to our
traditions they are constitutionally "suspect."40
Although many of the decisions striking down invidious discrimi-
nation based on one's economic status have relied upon both the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,41
it seems that the Equal Protection Clause, as applied in Tate and
Williams, is a more extensive and specific safeguard for prohibiting
unfairness than that demanded by the Due Process Clause.
[T]he framers and adopters of this Amendment were not content
to depend on a mere minimum secured by the due process clause,
or upon the spirit of equality which might not be insisted on by
local public opinion. They therefore embodied that spirit in a
specific guaranty.42
36 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-33 (1921).3T See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Sunday Lake Iron
Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1917); Gundling v. Chicago,
177 U.S. 183, 186 (1899).38 See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947); Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1963); Hughes
v. Heinze, 268 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1959); Coffelt v. Bryant, 381 S.W.2d 731,
736 (Ark. 1964).
39 See note 24 supra, and accompanying text. In Burruss v. Wilkerson, 301
F. Supp. 1237, 1239-40 (W.D. Va. 1968), the Court said:
It is clear beyond question that discrimination based on poverty is no
more permissible than racial discrimination, and that the discrimination
on the part of the state officials need not be intentional to be condemned
under the equal protection clause .... [S]tate policies imposing condi-
tions on the exercise of basic rights, which conditions operate harshly
on the poor, must be clearly justified in order to be constitutionally
permissible....
40 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1942). Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400,
406 (1941); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1885).41 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington
State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).4 2 Traux v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921). See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1953). In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) the
Court stated that ". . . the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the pro-
tection of equal laws."
(Continued on next page)
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In Williams the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause re-
quired the maximum statutory penalty for any substantive offense to
be the same for all defendants regardless of their economic status.
43
This opinion is not read to require that mere inequality of sentences
44
are indicative of violations of the Equal Protection Clause. However,
when a fine is imposed and the defendant is found to be indigent the
"subsequent use of imprisonment to enforce payment of the fine ...
vitiates the previous fundamental decision to deal with the offender by
fine." 45 When an indigent defendant is fined, the fundamental purpose
of the fine is converted into the very jail sentence which it was designed
to avoid.46 In setting sentences, the court must look to the pertinent
statutes and if an offense is punishable by the imposition of a fine
solely, then the courts should not be permitted to imprison an indigent
defendant on his default of payment.47 Such imprisonment is unfair
and unjustifiable as a penal or correctional objective. If a jail sentence
would have better served the needs of public safety or the welfare
of the offender, the legislature would have provided such a sentence,
rather than merely providing a fine as the only sentence.
Tate has attempted to lessen some of the social inequities inherent
in our fine system by providing equal justice for the indigent defendant.
Prior to Tate, the defendant with means received a proportionately
smaller sanction than an indigent defendant. A mere lack of money
caused the indigent to be imprisoned, while the defendant with
means was given a choice to either pay the fine or go to jail. Realis-
tically, the indigent had no choice and was comparably placed at a
disadvantage.
48
In general, one of the overriding principles repeatedly urged is that
the financial capabilities of the offender should be taken into con-
sideration, because unless fines are proportioned to the defendant's
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
In Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1941) the Court held:
Equal protection of the laws is something more than an abstract right. It
is a command which the State must respect, the benefits of which every
person may demand. Not the least merit of our constitutional system
is that its safeguards extend to all. ...
43 399 U.S. at 244.44 In 4 HousT. L. REV., supra note 17, at 699-700 (1967), it was stated:
To require absolute equality of sentences would go against the trend of
modem penology which emphasizes individualization in the sentencing
process.4 5 RuaN, supra note 9, at 254. See also People v. Gittelson, 25 A.D.2d 265,
-, 268 N.Y.S.2d 779, 785 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
46 See 101 U. PA. L. REv., supra note 13, at 1021.
47 57 CATnF. L. REv., supra note 10, at 793.
48 See 22 Vm. L. REv., supra note 26, at 632; Comment, 1966 U. ILL. L.F
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ability to pay, they will be treated lightly by persons of means and
will be an unbearable burden on the poor.
49
The Tate holding should cause many states to abolish their present
practice of providing a statutory formula based on a specific monetary
credit for each day the defendant is incarcerated. Such a formula can
provide long sentences and is an arbitrary figure which bears no rela-
tion to modem penological goals, nor to economic efficiency.50 Although
legislative reform would seem to be preferred over judicial reform 5'
in the area of fines, the state legislatures have been slow to respond to
the problems of the poor. Therefore the Court has taken the lead,
forcing legislative reforms (as in other areas where indigents' rights
were withheld )52 through the constitutional invalidation of statutes
which fall within the purview of Tate.
Even though Tate has, in effect, overruled a practice as old as the
common law, the Court did not attempt to establish any specific
alternative plans for the legislatures to follow. The Court observed,
citing Williams:
It is unnecessary for us to canvass the numerous alternatives to
which the State by legislative enactment-or judges within the
scope of their authority-may resort in order to avoid imprisoning
an indigent beyond the statutory maximum for involuntary non-
payment of a fine or court costs .... 53
One alternative is mentioned in Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in Tate which suggests that this decision might encourage the
states to abolish the present system of fines and substitute terms of
imprisonment for all offenses.54 However, the abolition of fines would
be an unrealistic alternative.5 5 The indigent defendant would not be
benefited in any manner and the defendant capable of paying the fine
would be imprisoned for an offense previously designed to be deterred
through an economic sanction. The burden would be displaced from
the indigent defendant to his counterpart and also to the State. If
fines were abolished the State would not only lose a direct source of
revenue but would also have to provide funds to maintain the offender
and, while he is in jail, his family may require state economic aid.
49 RuBN, supra note 9, at 238-39. See ABA, supra note 14, at 288; NATioNAL
PROBATION AND PAROLE AsSOCIATION GumEs FOR SENTENCING, 22 (1957).
50 See ABA, supra note 14, at 292.
51 See generally 81 HMAv. L. REv., supra note 25, at 448; 1966 U. ILL. L.F.,
supra note 48, at 466.
52 See note 24 supra, and accompanying text.
53 399 U.S. at 244.
54 39 U.S.L.W. at 4303 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55 See 81 HARv. L. REv., supra note 25, at 448; 64 MxcH. L. REv., supra note
10, at 945-46.
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Thus, while the abolition of fines appears to be the easiest method by
which to provide a substitution for current statutes, it would be both
unfair and very expensive.
Another alternative is the approach presently taken in a few states
whose statutes provide for a "pauper's oath" to be heard after a fixed
period of imprisonment.56 Tate would invalidate these statutes in their
present form, however, their basic approach could be changed into
an acceptable alternative. A hearing to establish the ability of a
defendant to pay a fine could be held at the time of sentence rather
than after a required term of imprisonment. However, if the same
result as provided in these "pauper's oath" statutes is desired, the
indigent defendant would go free and suffer neither incarceration nor
economic penalty. The defendant with the least means to pay, but
who has not been classified an indigent, is punished harshly. Because
the indigent defendant is not deterred, the sentencing motives of
correction are subverted.
A more realistic and appropriate alternative is for the court to
assess a fine based on an amount which a particular defendant is able
to pay, complemented by a method of installment or deferred system
of payments.57 Such a plan would enable the courts to impose a real-
istic fine on an indigent defendant and the offender would have a fair
chance to satisfy this sanction. A defendant with greater wealth would
pay a proportionately greater fine which would satisfy the deterrent
motivations of sentences.
Some states have already enacted legislation which allows an
indigent defendant to pay his fine in installments.58 Although an
argument can be made that an indigent will not be able to pay his
fine because he is unemployed, that problem can be solved by
furnishing him with state employment at the minimum wage. The
56E.G., ALAs. STAT. § 12.55.030 (1962) (available after thirty days, if no
non-exempt property exceeding $50); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-9 (1963)
(available after all legal means have been exhausted if defendant has no estate
and is without means); HAwAu REv. STAT. § 712-4 (1968) (available after thirty
days, if no non-exempt property exceeding $20); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-9(B)
(1964) (available after three months, if no property with which to pay); Gen.
Stat. of N.C. § 23-23-25 (1965) (available after twenty days if no property
with which to pay); ORE. REv. STAT. § 169.160 (1969) (available after thirty
days, if no non-exempt property exceeding $20). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3569
(1964) (available after thirty days if non-exempt property exceeding $20).57 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Pilot
Institute on Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231, 380 (1959).
5 8 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4106(b)
(Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 22-3425 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art.
52, § 18 (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1953); N.Y. CODE CBIM.
Paoc. § 470-d( 1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2947.11
(1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 953-56 (1964); WAsir. REv. CODE ANN. §
9.92.070 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-322 (1959).
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reader is probably wondering how difficult it would be to bring such
a plan into effect and more likely than not, may view this plan in a
pessimistic manner. However one's attitude may be changed upon
examination of the realistic steps that have already been taken by
some states, even before the decision in Tate was rendered. A recent
statute enacted by Delaware,59 whereby a person is placed in a
specific means of employment which enables him to adequately satisfy
his fine, could well serve as a model for future state legislatures to
follow.
The installment or deferred method of payment satisfies all the
relevant factors which need to be taken into consideration. The state
is economically benefited. Penological interests and sentencing motiva-
tions are advanced. More important, however, the indigent defendant's
constitutional rights are protected. Under such an alternative plan,
the indigent receives equal treatment-he has a choicel
John W. Oakley
FAmImy LAw-ALimoNY AND PROPERTy RESTORATIO- -A RESTATEMN.
-The problems of divorce, alimony,' and property settlement are
drawing increasing attention as legalists and theologians alike begin
59 DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 11, § 4106(b) (Supp. 1970). This statute reads in
pertinent part as follows:
Where a person sentenced to pay a fine, cost or both, on conviction of a
crime is unable or fails to pay such fine, costs or both, at the time of
imposition of sentence or in accordance with the terms of payment set
by the court, the court may order the person to report during regular
work days to the Director of Division of Corrections of the Department of
Health & Social Service, or a person designated by him, for work for a
number and schedule of days necessary to discharge the fine imposed.
The Division may approve public work projects for assignment of con-
victed persons.... The Director of the Division, or a person designated
by him, may also assign a convicted person to a private employer provided
the private employer shall compensate the convicted person at a rate of
pay no less than that normally paid to employees performing the same
or similar services for such an employer. The Division of Corrections
shall compensate any convicted person assigned to work under the super-
vision of any State, County or municipal agencies at a rate of pay equal
to that normally paid to employees performing the same or similar
services . .. The Division shall withhold from or require payment from
the periodic earnings of the convicted person all amounts not deemed by
the Division to be required to sustain the convicted person. . . . The
amount withheld shall be paid over to the State to be applied to the fine
and costs imposed until fully paid.
I "Alimony" is derived from the Latin alimonia, literally "sustenance." It is
used to denote that amount of money paid by one spouse (usually the husband)
to the other for support during and/or after a divorce proceeding. W. WiNrm,
ThE NEW CALIFoRmIA DuvoncE LAw 81 (1969). See also 24 Am. Jun. 2d Divorce
and Separation § 600 (1966).
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